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This paper contains the introduction to the new book, All Judges Are Political—Except When 
They Are Not:  Acceptable Hypocrisies and the Rule of Law (Stanford University Press, 2010).   
 
The book begins with the observation that Americans are divided in their beliefs about whether 
courts operate on the basis of unbiased legal principle or of political interest.  This division in 
public opinion in turn breeds suspicion that judges do not actually mean what they say, that 
judicial professions of impartiality are just fig leaves used to hide the pursuit of partisan 
purposes.   
 
Comparing law to the practice of common courtesy, the book explains how our courts not only 
survive under such suspicions of hypocrisy, but actually depend on them.   Law, like courtesy, 
furnishes a means of getting along:  it frames disputes in collectively acceptable ways, and it is a 
habitual practice, drummed into the minds of citizens by popular culture and formal institutions. 
The rule of law, understood as the rules of etiquette, is neither particularly fair nor free of 
paradoxical tensions, but it endures.  Although pervasive public skepticism raises fears of 
judicial crisis and institutional collapse, such skepticism is also an expression of how our legal 
system ordinarily functions.  
    
 
  
                                        
∗  This paper is an excerpt from ALL JUDGES ARE POLITICAL—EXCEPT WHEN THEY 
ARE NOT: ACCEPTABLE HYPOCRISIES AND THE RULE OF LAW, by Keith J. Bybee, (c) 
2010 by the Board of Trustees of the Leland Stanford Jr. University, all rights reserved.  No 
further reproduction, use nor distribution, in any form or/and by any means, is allowed without 
the prior written permission from the publisher, www.sup.org.  This excerpt has been posted to 
SSRN with permission by SUP. 
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In the winter of 2003, the New York Times announced the triumph of “legal realism,” the 
theory that suggests judicial decisionmaking is essentially a matter of politics.1  The 
announcement occurred in the course of reporting on Justice Thomas Spargo’s energetic 
participation in the political process.  When campaigning for a New York town judgeship in 
1999, Spargo handed out free cider and doughnuts, distributed coupons for free gas at a 
convenience store, sent free pizzas to school teachers and government workers, and bought a 
round of drinks for everyone at a local watering hole.2  Once elected town justice, Spargo kept 
up his political activities by speaking at partisan fundraisers and, more famously, by participating 
in obstreperous protests at the Miami-Dade County Board of Elections, with “the aim of 
disrupting the recount process” after the 2000 presidential election.3  Spargo’s political 
enthusiasm earned him a judicial promotion.  In 2001, he was elected to the State Supreme Court 
in Albany County.   
Spargo’s politicking was less popular in other quarters.  The New York State 
Commission on Judicial Conduct charged Spargo with violating the state rules governing judicial 
behavior.  In response, Spargo filed suit claiming that the state code of judicial conduct was 
unconstitutional.  The federal district court agreed.  Applying the United States Supreme Court 
decision Republican Party of Minnesota v. White, the court ruled that Spargo was free to be as 
politically active as he had been.4  Thus the New York Times was prompted to declare a conquest 
for legal realism, a victory for “the jurisprudential philosophy that calls for a frank 
acknowledgement of the role politics and other real-world factors play in judicial 
decisionmaking.”5 
Interestingly enough, Spargo himself was among the first to call legal realism’s victory 
into question.  Although he thought that the ruling was “absolutely good” because it freed judges 
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to be more involved in the political life of their communities, he otherwise believed that the 
decision pushed a political understanding of the courts too far.  “When people think of Tom 
Spargo,” Spargo said, “many would consider my reputation as a kind of partisan hack lawyer or 
Republican law expert.  But when you get on the bench, then all that is behind you. . . . 
[F]rankly, I have not had a political thought in any of the work that I’ve done as a judge.”  It was 
one thing to acknowledge that politics played a part in judicial life, but it was altogether 
something else to argue that judicial decisionmaking was all politics.  When it came to legal 
realism, Spargo seemed to suggest, it was best to accept a little bit, but not too much.6 
Spargo’s ambivalent reaction to his own exoneration seemed hard to believe.  How could 
he consistently lay claim to the roles of both politician and judge?  He had assiduously courted 
voters through frankly political electioneering.  On the basis of his behavior, one could easily 
infer that Spargo was a judge who could be counted on to represent the interests of his political 
supporters.  Yet, if this were true, then Spargo had misled litigants and the general public by 
claiming to be unbiased.  By trying to have it both ways, simultaneously playing partisan politics 
and claiming judicial impartiality, Spargo risked looking like a hypocrite:  his courtroom 
behavior appeared to be an act, an effort to affect a degree of neutrality and open-mindedness 
which he did not possess.  He claimed to give litigants a serious hearing, but his behavior 
suggested that he was just giving them the pretense of being heard.7 
In principle, Spargo easily could have avoided landing in such a bind.  He could have 
stuck to a single role and thus eliminated the appearance of hypocrisy.  For example, he could 
have responded to his courtroom victory by insisting that judicial decisionmaking is a thoroughly 
political enterprise.  The goal, Spargo might have claimed, is not to pretend that judges operate 
on the basis of neutral legal principles but to recognize that judges are political actors with power 
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over controversial policy questions.  As a result, Spargo could have argued that open judicial 
politicking is a welcome sight.  Vigorous judicial elections contested by aggressively political 
candidates allow voters to select and control the officials responsible for making legal policy.  
Reasoning along such lines, Spargo might have sincerely defended his actions as a critical 
contribution to democratic politics.8 
Alternatively, Spargo could have denounced the claims of legal realism from the outset.  
He could have argued that although elected politicians are necessarily obligated to represent the 
voters who placed them in office, judges are only required to “represent the Law.”9  The job of 
the judge, Spargo might have claimed, is to reason strictly on the basis of legal principle, to 
assimilate each dispute before the court into a coherent legal order, and to articulate a framework 
of rules capable of regulating subsequent judicial decisions.  Spargo could have run a low-key, 
nonpartisan campaign and muted his political participation once on the bench.  Indeed, he could 
have argued against the whole idea of judicial elections and insisted that a judge’s loyalty to the 
law rightly renders him indifferent to popularity.  Had Spargo sincerely cultivated a reputation 
for independence and impartiality, he would have eliminated the risk of being seen as a “partisan 
hack lawyer.”  He would have had no reason to contest charges leveled by the Commission on 
Judicial Conduct, since he would have never engaged in any judicially untoward actions in the 
first place. 
And yet Spargo did not adopt either of these alternative strategies.  Instead of choosing 
between the roles of active politician and impartial judge, he clung to both and defended his 
behavior by arguing that judges are political actors—except when they are not.   
The legal realism that Spargo at once embraced and renounced has a venerable lineage.   
In 1897, Oliver Wendell Holmes, then a member of the Supreme Judicial Court of 
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Massachusetts, warned his Boston University School of Law audience against supposing that 
“the only force at work in the development of the law is logic.”  “This mode of thinking is 
entirely natural,” Holmes admitted.  “The training of lawyers is the training in logic.  The 
processes of analogy, discrimination, and deduction are those in which they are most at home.  
The language of judicial decision is mainly the language of logic.  And logical method and form 
flatter that longing for certainty and repose which is in every mind.”  The natural mode of 
thinking about the law clearly feels right, but Holmes argued that it is in fact wrong.  Certainty, 
Holmes famously said, “is illusion and repose is not the destiny of man.  Behind the logical form 
lies a judgment as to the relative worth of and importance of competing legislative grounds, often 
an inarticulate and unconscious judgment, it is true, and yet the very root and nerve of the whole 
proceeding.”10  Lawyers and judges may talk of sound logic, impersonal principle, and impartial 
judgment, but the law is actually driven by politics. 
In the decades following Holmes’s address, a loose group of scholars that came to be 
known as legal realists took up Holmes’s remarks and fashioned them into a way of thinking 
about the judicial process.  The realists devoted themselves to exposing the role played by 
politics in judicial decisionmaking and, in doing so, they called into question conventional 
efforts to anchor judicial power on a fixed legal foundation.  The realist rejection of objective 
judicial reasoning proved to be quite popular and has been widely adopted.  Less than one 
hundred years after Holmes spoke, a prominent legal historian noted that the claim “we are all 
realists now” had been made so often in legal scholarship that it was a kind of truism.11 
The remarkable fact about legal realism, however, is that in spite of its impressive 
provenance and current popularity, it occupies an uncertain position.  When one considers the 
context in which American courts operate, the picture of legal realism that emerges is decidedly 
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mixed.  On one hand, many Americans acknowledge that the judicial process is infused with 
politics; on the other hand, almost everyone seems to believe that judicial decisions are 
determined on nonpolitical, purely legal grounds.  Spargo is far from being alone.  In the public 
discourse about the courts, the claims of legal realism are simultaneously proclaimed from the 
rooftops and disavowed in the streets.  The American judiciary is said to be squarely situated in 
politics, yet it is not, somehow, thought to be entirely of politics. 
In Part I of this book, I examine the shape and significance of legal realism’s ambivalent 
status. I find that the courts—at both the state and federal levels—are generally viewed as hybrid 
institutions, caught between general expectations of impartial judicial decisionmaking and 
widespread beliefs about politically motivated judicial rulings.  Moreover, I find that the 
uncertain standing of legal realism provides fertile ground for public suspicion.  The political 
nature attributed to the judicial process often appears to be at odds with claims of judicial 
impartiality, naturally leading many to wonder whether judicial appeals to law are anything more 
than ad hoc rationalizations deployed to obscure political purposes.  One might argue that this 
state of affairs is not particularly significant.  Conflicting public views and their attendant 
suspicions are, after all, matters of appearance and perception.  Americans are reacting to the 
surface of the judicial process, and superficial assessments of how courts look may have little to 
do with how judges actually behave.  Perhaps the public’s opinion of the courts is less an 
inherently interesting phenomenon than a simple perceptual error in need of correction. 
Although I agree that Americans are making judgments about appearances, I disagree 
that such judgments are either unimportant or simply mistaken.  In part, my disagreement is 
motivated by the fact that the public’s views are supported by scholarship:  research suggests 
good reasons to believe that the modern judicial process really is an uneasy mix of legal and 
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political factors.  Beyond the validation provided by scholars, the public’s views merit attention 
in their own right.  Judicial legitimacy has long been understood to derive from what judges do 
and from how they look doing it.  Public confidence in the judiciary ultimately depends not only 
on the substance of court rulings but also on the ability of judges to convey the impression that 
their decisions are driven by the impersonal requirements of legal principle.  Public suspicion of 
the courts is therefore worth paying attention to because it threatens judicial capacities.  Litigants 
may not respect court orders when they suspect that a judge is advancing a political agenda.  
Indeed, citizens may be led to doubt the authority of government as a whole when they suspect a 
powerful institution is misrepresenting its manner of operation.12 
But this is only part of the picture.  As I will argue over the course of this book, the 
public’s half-politics-half-law understanding of the courts not only chips away at judicial 
legitimacy but also forms an essential part of the current legal order.  Public skepticism about 
whether judges actually mean what they say is potentially corrosive, but it also points to an 
enabling dynamic that makes possible the exercise of legal power.  My overall goal is to 
illustrate and critique the means by which suspicions of judicial hypocrisy feed into the legal 
process, producing a rule of law that facilitates mutually beneficial accommodations among 
individual citizens and at the same time sustains hierarchies across different groups.13  I take the 
first step toward my overall goal by describing how legal realism today is simultaneously 






1.  Adam Liptak, “Judges Mix with Politics,” New York Times, February 22, 2003, B1–B8.  I am 
using a rough-and-ready definition of legal realism.  The realists actually developed a complex 
range of related ideas and theories.  For different accounts of legal realism’s genesis and 
development in the United States, see Edward A. Purcell Jr., The Crisis of Democratic Theory: 
Scientific Naturalism and the Problem of Value (Lexington: University Press of Kentucky, 
1973); Laura Kalman, Legal Realism at Yale, 1927–1960 (Chapel Hill: University of North 
Carolina Press, 1986); Morton J. Horwitz, The Transformation of American Law, 1870–1960: 
The Crisis of Legal Orthodoxy (New York: Oxford University Press, 1992); John Henry 
Schelegel, American Legal Realism and Empirical Social Science (Chapel Hill: University of 
North Carolina Press, 1995); Neil Duxbury, Patterns of American Jurisprudence (New York: 
Oxford University Press, 1995); and Stephen M. Feldman, American Legal Thought from 
Premodernism to Postmodernism: An Intellectual Voyage (New York: Oxford University Press, 
2000). 
2.  Spargo v. New York State Comm’n on Judicial Conduct, 244 F.Supp.2d 72, 79 (N.D.N.Y., 
2003). 
3.  Ibid., 80. 
4.  Republican Party of Minnesota v. White, 536 U.S. 765 (2002). 
5.  Liptak, “Judges Mix with Politics,” B1. 
6.  Al Baker, “Partisan Pit Bull, but Not on the Bench,” New York Times, February 22, 2003, 
New York and Region section.  Spargo’s belief that the district court may have gone too far was 
ultimately vindicated.  In December 2003, the Second Circuit Court of Appeals vacated the 
district court decision on the grounds that Spargo’s constitutional claims had been improperly 
raised in federal court.  Spargo v. New York State Com’n on Judicial Conduct, 351 F.3d 65, 85 
8 
 
(2d Cir. 2003).  The disciplinary actions against Spargo subsequently resumed in New York with 
the additional charge that Spargo had solicited money for his legal defense from attorneys with 
cases pending in his court.  In December of 2004, the state Supreme Court rejected Spargo’s 
constitutional challenge to the state code of judicial conduct (“Decision of Interest: Restrictions 
on Judicial Speech in Conduct Rules Are Not Unconstitutionally Vague,” New York Law 
Journal, December 16, 2004, 19).  As Spargo’s legal fortunes turned, he suggested that the 
courts were now swinging too far in the other direction and failing to respect judicial candidates’ 
freedom of speech:  “You know, in my experience, under our restrictive and rather obtuse rules, 
it is much harder to become a judge than to do a good job once you are actually on the bench.  
Perhaps more judicial freedom of speech will result in more good judges being elected to the 
bench.”  See Thomas J. Spargo, A Peripatetic View of Judicial Free Speech, 68 Alb. L. Rev. 629, 
634 (2005).  In March 2006, the New York State Commission on Judicial Conduct unanimously 
recommended that Spargo be removed from the bench.  See John Caher, “Commission Calls for 
N.Y. Judge’s Removal,” New York Law Journal, April 3, 2006, 
http://www.law.com/jsp/article.jsp?id=1143812717567 (last accessed August 30, 2009).  The 
Court of Appeals upheld the removal recommendation, thus ending Spargo’s judicial career.  In 
December 2008, Spargo was indicted by a federal grand jury for attempted extortion and 
soliciting a bribe.  He was convicted on all counts in August 2009.  In December 2009, Spargo 
was sentenced to twenty-seven months in federal prison. 
7.  In other words, Spargo appeared to lack what H.L.A. called an “internal” view of the law. See 
H.L.A. Hart, The Concept of Law, 2nd ed. (New York: Oxford University Press, 1994), 56–57, 
89–91.  For further discussion of Hart, see notes 116 and 121. 
9 
 
8.  Compare the similar argument made by Justice Scalia. Republican Party v. White, 576 U.S. at 
784.  See also Judicial Elections White Paper Task Force, Judicial Selection White Papers: The 
Case for Partisan Judicial Elections, 22 Tol. L. Rev 393, 393–409 (2002). 
9.  White, 536 U.S. at 803 (Justice Ginsburg dissenting, internal citations and quotation marks 
omitted).  See also Terri Jennings Peretti, In Defense of a Political Court  (Princeton, NJ: 
Princeton University Press, 1999), 11–35; and Richard A. Wasserstrom, The Judicial Decision: 
Toward a Theory of Legal Justification (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 1961), 14–22. 
10.  Oliver Wendell Holmes, The Path of the Law, 10 Harv. L. Rev. 457, 465–466 (1897). 
11.  Kalman, Legal Realism, 229. See also William Twining, Karl Llewellyn and the Realist 
Movement (Norman, OK: University of Oklahoma Press, 1985), 382. 
12.  The spread of public suspicion presents a potential problem for judicial legitimacy, but it 
does not necessarily present a problem for legal realism as a theory of legal behavior.  Several 
legal realists argued that judicial decisionmaking could not openly and exclusively be anchored 
in something other than the law and, at the same time, easily remain a legitimate “legal” process.  
For example, both Jerome Frank and Thurman Arnold believed that the open acknowledgement 
of the role of non-legal factors in judicial decisionmaking would ultimately require the broad 
psychological transformation of many individuals.  Frank and Arnold understood that the judicial 
process could not be considered to be exclusively political—and nonetheless still be accepted as 
legally authoritative—unless we developed a new kind of person.  Public doubt and uncertainty 
about judicial decisionmaking in the absence of such personal transformation would 
not have surprised either Frank or Arnold.  See Thurman W. Arnold, The Symbols of 
Government (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 1935) and Jerome Frank, Law and the 





clear over the course of the book, I agree with these realists that the tensions between law and 
politics in the judicial process are not going away.  See also my discussion of Arnold in Keith J. 
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cluster of beliefs, habits, and practices constitute the American rule of law.   
